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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of income inequality on the level of innovative activities in a 
model where innovations result in quality improvements. The market for quality goods is 
characterized by a natural oligopoly with three types of consumers - rich, middle class and 
poor. In general, we find that for reasons of strategic price setting a more equal distribution of 
income is favourable for innovation incentives. This is consistent with empirical evidence 
suggesting that countries with a more equal distribution of income have grown faster.  
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1. Introduction 
Is the existence of a rich class necessary to stimulate innovative activities or is it a high 
purchasing power of the middle class? According to the former view, high profits accruing from 
the rich - due to their higher willingness to pay for new goods or better qualities - drive the 
incentives to conduct R&D. According to the latter, a high purchasing power for the middle 
class creates large markets, and consequently high innovation incentives. 
It is the aim of this paper to study systematically the impact of income inequality on the level 
of innovative activities for the case that innovations result in quality improvements. While our 
set-up resembles those of the standard endogenous growth models of vertical product 
differentiation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman, 1991), it differs in two 
important respects. First, previous papers have assumed homothetic preferences for the quality 
good. This implies that the distribution of income has no impact on the size of the market. As a 
result income inequality and the rate of innovation are uncorrelated. This is different in our 
model. Each consumer purchases only one unit of a quality good, while the remaining 
expenditures are spent on a standardised (composite) commodity. Within this framework the 
differences in the willingness to pay between consumers determine the price which producers 
of different qualities can charge. Via this channel income distribution affects profits and the 
incentives to innovate.1 
Second, an implication of most previous models is that in equilibrium only the quality leader is 
on the market. In the present model this turns out to be a special case. The market structure 
is characterized by a natural oligopoly. The static price equilibrium within such a framework 
has been studied in various papers (Gabszwicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980, Shaked and Sutton, 
1982, 1983) assuming that incomes (or tastes) are uniformly distributed.2 For our purpose, this 
has the disadvantage that only one dimension of inequality - the range of the distribution - can 
be studied. Instead, we concentrate the analysis on a discrete distribution with three types of 
individuals - the rich, the middle class, and the poor.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 A paper by Glass (1995) uses preferences similar to the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model of quality 
ladders, but assumes that there are two types of households with different tastes about quality. It is because of 
this assumption that income distribution plays a role. 
2 O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1995) extend this framework to study the role of patent policies in a model 
of cumulative innovations. While using a similar framework to ours they restrict the analysis to study a partial 
(industry) equilibrium. 
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The general equilibrium of the model can be characterized by four different regimes. In one 
equilibrium, the quality leader sells to the rich, whereas the middle class purchases the 
second-best, and the poor buy the third-best quality. We will call this a "separating 
equilibrium". In "partially separating equilibria" the top quality producer serves the rich, the 
second-best supplier sells to the poor, whereas the middle class purchases either the best or 
the following quality. Finally, in a "pooling equilibrium" the producer of the top quality captures 
the entire market. It is intuitively clear that the latter situation will arise if the degree of 
heterogeneity of consumers is rather small. In contrast, when incomes are unevenly 
distributed, a separating equilibrium will arise. 
How income inequality affects the rate of innovation depends crucially on the price regime 
under consideration. Consider a pooling equilibrium. To conquer the whole market, the quality 
leader has to set a price such that the poor can afford the top quality. Since this price depends 
exclusively on the poors' willingness to pay for quality, neither the purchasing power of the 
middle class nor the amount of income concentrated in the hands of the poor have an impact 
on the incentives to innovate. The results are more subtile in the other regimes. In a separating 
equilibrium the third-best supplier sets the highest possible price to attract the poor, given that 
worse firms set their price at marginal cost. The leading firm and its immediate follower pursue 
an analogous policy: given the price of the next lower quality, charge the highest price the own 
clientel is willing to pay. Under such a situation, both more purchasing power for the poor and 
for the middle class tends to lead to a more profitable structure of prices for quality goods. The 
role of the middle class in the partially separating regime, however, turns out to be ambiguous. 
In general, the results imply that a more equal distribution of income is favourable for innovation 
incentives. This leads us to two interesting observations. First, while the profits from the rich 
may be most important in quantitative terms (both because they accrue immediately and 
because the rich pay the highest prices), it is for strategic reasons why a high purchasing 
power of the middle class or of the poor is likely to be more favourable for innovation incentives. 
Second, to the extent that quality improving innovations are the source of economic growth, 
this relationship between inequality and innovations is consistent with empirical evidence. A 
number of studies (Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Clarke, 1995) have 
found that countries with a more equal distribution of income have grown faster. In contrast to 
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many other attempts to explain the evidence, our model stresses the importance of the 
composition of demand.3 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe the set-up of the model and 
describe the optimal choice of consumers and firms, both per period and over time. In section 
3, we study the properties of the dynamic equilibrium and consider the effects of changes in 
inequality. Section 4 summarises.  
2. The Model 
2.1 Consumers 
There exist three groups of consumers, P, M and R, distinguished by wealth A A AP M R< < . 
At any instant of time t, consumer i (i = P, M, R) can buy c ti( )  units of a standardised good 
and one unit of a quality good, where the qualities q tj( ),  j = 0, -1, -2, ... are available at prices 
p j(t), resp. The price of the standardised good is 1. 
Instantaneous utility of consumer i buying quality qj is described by the utility function 
ln ( ) ln ( )c t q ti j+ , the same for all groups. Thus, at time t a household maximises life-time 
utility (q denotes the rate of time preference) 
 (2.1) U c t q t e dti j
t= +ò
- -
¥
(ln ( ) ln ( )) ( )q t
t
 
 s.t. 
(2.2) A we dt c t e dt p t e dti
r t
i
r t
j
r t( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )t t t t
ttt
+ ³ + òòò
- - - - - -
¥¥¥
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3 Exceptions are Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) who consider the importance of the composition of demand 
for the adoption of modern technologies, and Falkinger (1994), Zweimüller (1994) who study demand composition 
effects on the incentives to introduce new goods. Other work has focused either on political issues (see e.g. 
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Perotti, 1993, Saint Paul and Verdier, 1993) or have 
stressed the importance of capital market imperfections (see e. g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Torvik, 1993, Aghion and 
Bolton, 1991, Banjeree and Newman, 1993). 
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where w is wage income, r the interest rate (both constant over time), and p tj( )  is the price of 
the quality bought in t. The left-hand side of (2.2) can be written as A i(t) + w/r, it is denoted by 
Ki(t), a person's endowment with human and non-human capital in t.  
The following analysis is restricted to steady-states: among the time paths of variables 
resulting from optimising decisions of the consumers (and of the firms, discussed in 2.2) we 
concentrate on those where all quantities grow at the same rate. 
Equal growth rates of Ki and Ai imply & &K Ai i= = 0 , as w is constant over time. &K i  equals 
current income rK i minus expenditures ci(t) + pj(t), hence the sum ci(t) + pj(t) = rK i must remain 
constant. Furthermore, in a steady-state the interest rate has to be equal to the rate of time 
preference. Setting r = q in (2.1) and (2.2) implies that the optimum consumption path requires 
ci to be constant over time, for any given paths of qj(t) and pj(t), hence also constancy of pj. 
Thus we can write  
 (2.3) ci = qKi - pj = w + qAi - pj,     i = P, M, R, 
and instantaneous utility of a consumer i buying quality qj as ln (qKi - pj) + ln qj(t). Obviously, a 
consumer maximises life-time utility by maximising instantaneous utility with respect to quality 
qj at any point of time. 
2.2 Prices 
The market for the c-good is competitive. All firms produce with a unit labour input 1/w. Since 
this good is the numeraire, w is the wage rate. The market for the quality good is oligopolistic. 
At any instant of time many different qualities qj(t), j = 0, -1, -2, ... have been invented, each by 
a different firm, where q0(t) > q-1(t) > q-2(t) > ... . Successive quality levels differ by a factor k > 
1: qj(t) =  k × qj-1(t).4 There are constant marginal costs w×a, where a (<1) is the labour 
coefficient, the same in all firms. The problem is characterized by asymmetric information in 
the sense that firms cannot distinguish buyers by wealth. The shares of group P, M and R in 
the population, bP, bM and bR = 1 -  bP - bM, respectively, and the preferences are known. 
The life-time of a firm is uncertain. A firm supplies quality qj until the next innovation takes 
place. From that event until a further innovation, this firm supplies quality qj-1, and so on. It 
follows that the price setting problem can be viewed as a repeated game in continuous time, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4 The process of how innovations are created is discussed in Subsection 2.3. 
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where the firms (the players) want to maximise long-term profits. Since we are interested in 
steady-states, we look for equilibria where prices are constant over time. 
As qj = kmqj-m, for all j = 0, -1, -2, ..., m = 1, 2, ..., where k > 1, we can compute the maximum 
price pj , given pj-m, such that consumer i prefers quality qj to qj-m, from the equation ln (qKi - 
pj ) + ln qj = ln(qKi - pj-m) + ln qj-m:
5 
 (2.4) p K
k
k
p
kj i
m
m
j m
m=
-æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ + -q
1
. 
Obviously, (2.4) can also be used to determine the upper bound of pj-m such that consumer i 
prefers quality qj-m, given pj . As pj  increases in both Ki and m (note qKi - pj = ci > 0), we get 
Lemma 1: (i) If for prices pj, pj-m some consumer prefers quality qj to qj-m, any richer consumer 
does the same.  
 (ii) If pj ³ wa, for the price of some quality qj, j = -1, -2, ..., then for the producer of any quality 
qj+m, 1 £ m £ - j there exists a price pj+m > wa, such that any consumer prefers quality qj+m 
to qj. 
Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium at most the three highest qualities are actually produced 
and sold.6 The four possible situations are: (i) q0 is sold to all three groups of consumers 
(pooling), (ii) q0 is sold to R and M, q-1 to P (partially separating, case A), (iii) q0 is sold to R, q-1 
to M and P (partially separating, case B) and (iv) q0, q-1, q-2 are sold to groups R, M, P, resp. 
(separating). 
Which equilibrium prices correspond to these situations? To study this question, we refer to 
Figure 1, where p0, p-1, p-2 are shown on the axis. Lines AB and CD, resp., refer to (2.4) with j = 
-1, m = 1, i = M (i = P, resp.): maximum p-1 such that the group-M (group-P) consumers prefer 
q-1 to q-2, given p-2; note KP < KM. Analogously, lines EF and GH refer to (2.4) with j = 0, m = 1, 
i = R (i = M, resp.). Finally, line IJ refers to (2.4), with j = 0, m = 1, i = P: maximum p0 such 
that the poor prefer q0 to q-1, given p-1. Points G and I have the same position in the (p0, p-1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5 We use the general convention that quality qj is chosen if, for given pj, pj-m, buying qj or qj-m leads to the same 
utility level.  
6 If q-3 was in the market (which means p-3 ³ wa), one of qualities q0, q-1, q-2 could not be sold, as there are only 
three groups of consumers. However, by Lemma 1 (ii), higher qualities can always drive out lower qualities. 
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quadrant as A and C in the (p-1,p-2) quadrant. Moreover, the slopes of all lines are equal in the 
sense that ¶ ¶p p kj j/ /- =1 1 . 
Additionally, pS-2  is defined by (2.4) with j = -2, m = 1, i = P and p-3 = wa (maximum price of q-2 
in order to deter q-3 from entry) and p
x
0  is defined by (2.4) with j = 0, m = 2, i = P and p-2 = wa 
(maximum p0 such that the poor prefer q0 to q-2, given p-2 = wa.. 
Note that wa is the lowest possible price of any quality and that wa < qKi, because qKi = w + 
qAi and a < 1. From Figure 1 and the respective definitions the following facts are immediate: 
 
Figure 1 
a) wa < pS-2  = p p p
SA PO x
- = <1 0 0 . 
b) In equilibrium p-2 £ p
S
-2 , p-1 £ p
S
-1 , p0 £ p
S
0  must hold. 
c) If and only if p-1 > p
SA
-1 , the q-2-producer can choose a price p-2 such that group P prefers 
his quality to q-1 and he makes a profit. 
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d) If and only if p0 > p
PO
0 , the q-1-producer can choose a price p-1 such that group P prefers 
his quality to q0 and he makes a profit. 
From these facts we can draw the following conclusions: 
(i) Pooling occurs only if prices are: p0 £ p
PO
0 , p-1 = wa, p-2 = wa (note d) and p
PO
0  < p
x
0 ).  
(ii) Partially separating, case A (R and M buy q0, P buys q-1) occurs only if prices (p0, p-1) are 
in the area GIUV (line UV excluded) and p-2 = wa. (Note c) for the upper bound for p-1). 
(iii) Partially separating, case B (R buys q0, M and P buy q-1) occurs only if prices (p0, p-1) are 
in the area EGVW (line GV excluded), and p-2 = wa. 
(iv) Separating occurs only at prices (p0,  p-1,  p-2), where (p0,  p-1) is in the area WVHF (VH 
excluded), and the corresponding pair (p-1, p-2) is in the area ACDB (CD excluded). (Note 
b) from which the upper bounds for p-1 and p0 follow.) 
It is well-known that in an infinitely repeated game a large set of possible solutions exists, 
each of which can be supported by appropriate punishment strategies. However, in the present 
case it is possible to restrict this set to four triples of prices, by a simple and plausible general 
principle: No player is punished if he changes his price without affecting the other players' 
profits. 
After applying this principle the points (I, Z), (V, C), (W, C), (F, B) are left as equilibria, 
corresponding to the situations (i) - (iv), resp.7 A pooling equilibrium (I, Z) is decided by the q0-
producer alone, if he receives maximum profit by setting a price sufficiently low such that all 
groups buy his quality. In this case (I, Z) represents a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.8. 
Concerning a separating equilibrium (F, B) it is straightforward to describe situations where the 
present value of each firm's profit is higher there than in any other equilibrium. (Clearly, this is 
always the case for the q-2-firm.) As to the partially separating equilibria, however, there may be 
a disagreement between the q0- and q-1-producers, as the latter always prefers (W, C) to (V, C) 
(because with (W, C) he sells to more consumers at the same price), while the former may 
prefer (V, C), if it pays for him to attract group M. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
7 Consider, e.g., the interior of GIUV (partial separation, case A): the q0 - and q-1-producers can both increase 
their prices by e without reducing each other's profit. One the line GV the q-1-producer can increase his price, 
while on IG and UV the q0-producer can do the same. A similar reasoning applies for any other possible triple of 
prices. 
8 The q-1 and q-2 producers are present as potential competitors, though they do not sell anything in the pooling 
situation. The q0-producer looses group P if he increases the price above p
PO
0 . 
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Summarising, we have the following triples of equilibrium prices: 
(2.5) Pooling: (p0, p-1, p-2) = ( , , )qK
k
k
wa
k
wap
- +1  wa  
(2.6) Partially separating, case A: 
  (p0, p-1, p-2) = ( , , )q q qK
k
k
K
k
k
wa
k
K
k
k
wa
k
waM P P
- + - + - +1 1 12 2  
(2.7) Partially separating, case B: 
  (p0, p-1, p-2) = ( , , )q q qK
k
k
K
k
k
wa
k
K
k
k
wa
k
waR P P
- + - + - +1 1 12 2  
(2.8) Separating: (p0, p-1, p-2) =  
 (q q qK k
k
K
k
k
K
k
k
wa
kR M P
- + - + - +1 1 12 3 3 , q qK
k
k
K
k
k
wa
kM P
- + - +1 12 2 ,  
 qK k
k
wa
kP
- +1 ) 
2.3 Research and Innovation 
Profit-seeking entrepreneurs engage in R&D to improve the quality good. A research success 
enables a firm to produce a quality k (> 1)-times better than the currently best. Innovations are 
random and arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter f. For the representative 
researcher f is a choice variable: employing fF workers (where F is a labour coefficient) 
"produces" R&D intensity f, so the flow of R&D costs is wfF. The flow of expected profits is 
fB, where B denotes the value of an innovation. B is the present value of profits of a successful 
researcher. The subsequent life-cycle of such a firm can be divided into several "periods", 
where a "period" is defined as the (random) interval between two successive innovations in the 
future. The firm produces the best (second-best, third-best, ...) quality during period t = 0 (1, 2, 
...) of its life-cycle. Since the fourth-best producer will never have positive demand, we can 
confine the discussion to "periods" t = 0, 1, 2. Denoting Pt as instantaneous profits during 
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period t and fe as the expected intensity of future research activities, B may be calculated as 
V t e
t
e
t
t
= +å +
=
P f f q/ ( ) 1
0
2
.9 
The objective function of the representative research firm may be written as fB - fwF. Since 
there is costless access to R&D activities, in equilibrium B £ wF, with equality for f > 0. 
Otherwise entering R&D would still be profitable. Moreover, in a steady-state we must have f = 
fe. Then, the innovation equilibrium condition wF = B reads: 
 (2.9)  wF t
t
t
t= å +
=
+P f f q
0
2 1/ ( )   for  f > 0. 
The particular form of the right-hand-side of (2.9) depends on the type of price equilibrium. 
Denote Pi as the profit flow from serving the market for group i. Then in a separating 
equilibrium, we have P0 = PR, P1 = PM, P2 = PP. In a pooling regime, on the other hand, P0 = 
PR + PM + PP whereas Pt = 0 for t > 0. Finally, in a partially separating equilibrium, P2 = 0 and 
P0 and P1 depend on whether the middle class purchases the q0-or the q-1-quality. 
3. Inequality and the rate of innovations 
3.1.  The distribution of assets and the allocation of resources 
It is assumed that profits after an innovation constitute the unique source of aggregate wealth, 
denoted by v. The distribution of v among households is given by four parameters: dP, dM, bP 
and bM. As defined earlier, bi represents the population share of group i. di is the ratio of assets 
owned by household i relative to per-capita wealth, so di = Ai/(v/L), where L is the size of the 
population. Given values of (dP, dM, bP, bM) determine the parameters for group R: bR = 1 - bP - 
bM and dR = (1 - bPdP - bMdM)/(1- bP - bM).10 With these definitions bPdP, bMdM and (1 - bPdP - 
dMbM) are the respective shares in aggregate wealth. From inspection of the Lorenz-curve it 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9 B is e E s dss- -
¥
ò
q t
t
( ) ( )P , where EP(s), expected profit in time s, is the weighted sum of the profits in s in case 
that zero, one or two innovations will occur until s, i.e., in case that in s the firm will be in period 0, 1 or 2. Hence 
EP(s) = Pt e
t
t
s[( ( ))f t-å
=0
2
 exp( ( ))- -f te s / t!], where the expression in square brackets is the probability 
of t innovations in the interval [ t ,s]. Evaluating the above integral yields the expression in the text. 
10 The obvious restrictions on dP and dM are 0 £ dP < min(1,dM), and dP< dM < (1 - bPdP)/(1-bP), where the last 
inequality ensures dM < dR. 
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follows that increasing dP or dM as well as decreasing bP or bM unambiguously yields a more 
even distribution of assets. 
By assumption, each household supplies one unit of labour, so total supply is equal to L. How 
L is allocated among sectors depends (i) on labour demand for research, fF, (ii) on 
employment in the quality sector, aL (note that every individual buys one unit), and (iii) on 
labour demand for the c-good,  [ ]( / ) ( )1 1w c L c L c LP P M M P M Rb b b b+ + - - . The resource 
constraint is therefore: 
 (3.1) [ ]L F aL w L c c cP P M M P M R= + + + + - -f b b b b( / ) ( )1 1  
3.2.  The steady-state equilibrium 
The general equilibrium is defined by the conditions (2.3) - optimal consumption, one of (2.5) to 
(2.8) - non-cooperative equilibrium prices for quality goods, (2.9) - innovation equilibrium, and 
(3.1) - full employment. To solve this system of equations for f and v we first use A i = div/L and 
Ki = A i + w/q to express pj (j = 0, -1, -2) and ci (i = P, M, R) in terms of the endogenous variable 
v. Then we can express the innovation equilibrium condition (2.9) and the full employment 
condition (3.1) in terms of v and f. As a result, the former relation implicitly defines a function 
v N= j f( ) , the "N-locus" in Figure 2. The latter relation can be written v R= j f( ) , the "R-line" 
in Figure 2. (See the Appendix for details and for the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.) 
 
Figure 2 
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Lemma 2. (i) The N-locus. In a separating and in both types of partially separating price 
regimes v N= j f( )  satisfies ¶j ¶fN /  > 0 provided that q sufficiently small. In a pooling 
equilibrium ¶j ¶fN /  > 0. 
 (ii) The R-line. The function v R= j f( )  is linear in f and has a negative slope.  
Lemma 2, part (i) establishes an upward sloping N-locus in Figure 2. To make a higher f 
profitable, consumers must be willing to pay more for quality which will be the case if assets, v, 
are higher. According to Lemma 2 (ii), the R-line in Figure 2 has a negative slope. More 
research activities are only possible if resources are transferred from the production to the R&D 
sector. This will be the case for a lower v, since then all households become poorer and reduce 
the level of ci.  
Proposition 1. 
 There exists a unique general equilibrium with positive f* and v*, provided that the rate 
of time preference is sufficiently small. In a pooling regime, it exists for any (positive) 
rate of time preference. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. According to (2.9), f approaches the limit 
S Pt t wF/ ( )  for q ® 0, thus the R&D intensity f is positive for small q. Moreover, since 
marginal utility from consuming the quantity good approaches infinity as ci goes to zero (see 
equation (2.1)), it will be consumed in positive amounts, which rules out a situation where the 
R&D-sector uses the whole resource base. Thus, the existence of an interior solution is 
guaranteed (point A in Figure 2). By Lemma 2(i), a sufficiently small q also implies that the N-
locus is monotonically increasing under all types of price regimes, whereas the R-locus has a 
negative slope. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. 
3.3. Inequality and the rate of innovation 
We now come to discuss the central question of the paper, namely how inequality in the 
distribution of assets influences the rate of innovation. It turns out that the answer to this 
questions depends crucially on the particular price regime. All proofs can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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A separating price regime. 
Proposition 2. In a separating price regime: (i) ¶f ¶* / dP  > 0 if b f f qP ( / ( ) )1
2 2- +  < 
bR k/
2 + b f f qM k/ (( ) )+  (sufficient), (ii) ¶f ¶* / dM  > 0 if  
 b f f q bM R k( / ( )) /1 - + <  (sufficient), (iii) ¶f ¶b* / P  < 0 and (iv) ¶f ¶b* / M  < 0. 
Recall that increasing di and decreasing bi (i = P, M) implies a more even distribution of assets. 
Proposition 2 therefore states that f is unambiguously increasing with less inequality, if the 
latter is due to lower group shares bi of either group M or P (and, consequently a larger share 
of group R)11. Moreover, increasing di (i = M, P) at the expense of dR has a tendency toward a 
higher f as well, although with respect to this dimension of inequality the effect is ambiguous. 
To understand the reason for the results in Proposition 2 it is instructive to consider the impact 
of the wealth distribution parameters on the price structure (equations (2.5) - (2.8) using K i =  
w/q + d v Li / ). If dP increases, the rich become poorer, whereas the middle class is not 
concerned. The poor are willing to pay more for quality, so p-2 will rise. Therefore also p-1 - the 
maximum price ensuring that the middle class prefers quality q-1 to q-2 - rises. The impact on 
p0, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, p0, the maximum price such that the rich prefer q0 
to q-1, can be larger with a larger p-1. On the other hand, a higher dP reduces the value of assets 
owned by the rich, and thus depresses their valuation of quality. If the sufficient condition in 
Proposition 2(i) is satisfied, p0 will increase. In that case all prices increase and innovation 
activities are more profitable for any given value of assets. In Figure 2 the N-locus shifts to the 
right. Moreover, if all pj's are higher, all consumers will spend less on the standard good ci, for 
any given value of v and more resources become available for R&D. The R-locus in Figure 2 
shifts also to the right. In sum, the economy is shifted from point A to point B, the latter being 
characterized by a larger rate of innovation. 
An analogous argument can be made for a change in dM. The only difference is that now p-2 
remains constant since the change in distribution does not concern the poor. p-1 will increase, 
whereas - just like before - the impact on p0 is ambiguous. Again, if the condition in Proposition 
2 (ii) is met, p0 increases, resulting in a higher intensity of R&D. 
A decrease in bP implies that the rich become relatively poorer, whereas the wealth positions of 
groups P and M remain unchanged. Consequently, p-2 and p-1 stay the same, while p0 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11 Recall that d d dR P P M M P M= - - - -( ) / ( )1 1b b b b , so decreasing either bM or bP decreases dR as 
well. Therefore not only becomes the group of rich larger, but also relatively poorer. 
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decreases. Since group P is now smaller, the market for quality q-2 has shrinked and PP has 
decreased. Group M is unaffected and therefore PM stays constant. The market for the q0-
producer has become larger as a result of a higher population share of the rich, whereas p0 is 
now smaller, since the rich have become relatively poorer. It is however straightforward to show 
that (i) PR unambiguously increases and (ii) that this increase is larger than the reduction in 
PP. This has two effects: First, it makes innovations more attractive, shifting the N-locus to the 
right. Second, since profits are higher, a larger part of expenditures is devoted to purchase the 
quality goods, with a resource releasing effect from the quantity-good sector. Consequently, 
also R shifts to the right and the economy moves from equilibrium A to B. Analogous 
arguments can be used to explain result (iv) in Proposition 2. 
Partially Separating Price Regime 
Case A: Group M purchases quality q0. 
Proposition 3A. In a partially separating equilibrium, where group M purchases quality q0:  
 (i) ¶f ¶* / dP  > 0, (ii) ¶f ¶* / dM > 0 , (iii) ¶f ¶b* / P  < 0, and (iv) ¶f ¶b* / M  = 0. 
If the middle class purchases the top quality, all distribution parameters have an unambiguous 
impact on f*. Increasing dP yields a larger p-1, hence p0, which is now the maximum price such 
that group M prefers q0 to q-1, will increase. This makes innovation more attractive and shifts 
the N-locus to the right. For a given value of v, higher prices for quality result in less 
expenditures for the c-good with a resource-saving effect. As a result, also R shifts to the right 
and f* unambiguously increases. A similar argument applies to the effects of an increase in dM 
(increase in p0).  
A more even income distribution through a decrease in bM does not change f*. The reason is 
that neither p-1 nor p0 are affected and the same amount of resources is spent on the c-good 
(albeit in a changed composition with respect to income classes). So R- and N-curves remain 
unaffected and f* stays constant. 
Finally, a decrease in bP leaves prices unchanged, because both the middle class and the poor 
are as wealthy as before. However, as profits from selling to the rich are higher than those from 
selling to the poor, total profits increase with a decrease of bP, implying less expenditures on 
the c-good. Moreover, innovation becomes more attractive, since the q0-good has now a larger 
market share. Consequently, the R- and the N-locus shift to the right and f* increases. 
Case B: Group M purchases q-1. 
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Proposition 3B. In a partially separating equilibrium, where group M purchases quality q-1:  
 (i) ¶f ¶* / dP > 0  if b f f q b b f f qp R Mk( / ( )) / / ( )1- + < + + , (ii) ¶f ¶* / dM < 0 ,  
 (iii) ¶f ¶b* / P < 0  and (iv) ¶f ¶b* / M < 0 . 
An increase in dP raises p-1 and has an ambiguous effect on p0 which now just ensures that the 
rich prefer q0 to q-1. As long as the sufficient condition in Proposition 3B (i) is satisfied, R- and 
N-locus both shift to the right leading to an increase in f*. 
Giving more purchasing power to the middle class discourages innovation activities. With a 
larger dM (= lower dR), p0 decreases whereas p-1 is independent of dM: the N-locus shifts to the 
left. Also, a lower p0 induces the rich to spend more on the c-good resulting in higher 
employment in production and less employment in R&D. So, the R-locus shifts to the left as 
well. 
A smaller group size of the poor increases the R&D intensity f* by a similar reason than 
before. p-1 stays constant, p0 is now smaller since a lower bP decreases dR. However,  the larger 
group size of the rich offsets this effect, and both R- and N-locus shift to the right. Exactly the 
same argument applies to a decrease in bM. 
A Pooling Price Regime 
Proposition 4. In a pooling price regime (all groups purchase quality q0): (i) ¶f ¶* / dP > 0 , and  
 (ii) ¶f ¶ ¶f ¶b ¶f ¶b* / * / * /dM P M= = = 0 .  
Increasing dP increases p0 which is now the maximum price such that the poor prefer q0 to q-1. 
This makes innovations more profitable and reduces the demand for the c-good. Consequently, 
both R- and N-locus shift to the right, f* increases. 
More purchasing power for the middle class has no effect in this scenario, since it has no 
impact on prices. With group shares staying the same only the composition (the rich consume 
less, the middle class consumes more) but not the aggregate demand for the c-good is 
affected. Consequently, there is no impact on f*. Since in a pooling equilibrium neither the R- 
nor the N-curve is affected by the size of the various groups, it immediately follows that neither 
bP nor bM have an impact on f*.  
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of the distribution of income on the rate of innovation. 
Inequality plays a role because consumers purchase the quality good in a fixed quantity, 
implying that richer households have a higher willingness to pay for quality. As a result, 
inequality affects the prices for the quality good and therefore the profitability of conducting 
R&D. We have confined the analysis to studying the distribution of wealth. It should be clear 
that exactly the same mechanisms are at work when households have different wage rates. 
In equilibrium, more firms in addition to the quality leader may have a positive market share, 
leading to various possible regimes in equilibrium. This is different from previous endogenous 
growth models where only the top quality producer is on the market. Within the present 
framework such a situation can only arise if the degree of heterogeneity between consumers is 
sufficiently small. With a more skewed distribution up to three firms may have a positive 
market share, since we have confined the analysis to three types of income classes - the poor, 
the middle and the rich.  
We find that less income inequality tends to improve the profitability of innovations. This is 
because a more equal distribution allows quality producers to charge higher prices: if only the 
quality leader is on the market, the price of his product can be larger if, due to more income, 
the poor are willing to pay more for quality; if more than one firm has a positive market share, 
not only the price for the worse quality can be higher with more equality, but also better 
qualities may be selling at higher prices. The role of a high purchasing power of the middle 
class turns out to be quite ambiguous, depending on the specific price regimes. 
16 — Zweimüller, Brunner / Heterogeneous Consumers, Vertical Product Differentiation — I H S 
Appendix 
To proof Lemma 2 and Propositions 1 - 4 we use equations (2.5) - (2.8) together with 
q qK w d v Li i= + /  and the formulas for bR and dR to express Pt, the profit flow of a quality 
producer during period t (t = 0, 1, 2) in terms of v and the parameters bP, bR, dP, dR. The Pt are 
described at the end of Subsection 2.3 for the four different regimes, where Pi i j
iL p wa= -b ( )  
with pj
i  as the price of the respective quality purchased by group i, i = P, M, R. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
 (i) The N-locus. jN is implicitly defined by writing equation (2.9) as N(f, v; bP, bM, dP, dM) = 0 
with N wF t
t t
t
( ) / ( )× = - + +å +
=
P f f q 1
0
2
. We have  
[N t tt t
t
f f q f f= + - +å
-
=
P ( ( ) ( ) ) /1 1
0
2
 ]( )f q+ +t 2 . Clearly, Nf < 0 for q small enough, while Nf < 
0 for any q if P1 = P2 = 0 (pooling equilibrium). N vv t
t
t t= å +
=
+( / ) / ( )¶P ¶ f f q
0
2 1  > 0 follows 
from differentiation of the Pt for the various regimes. ¶j ¶f f
N
vN N/ /= -  completes the proof 
of Lemma 2 (i). 
 (ii) The R-line. Equation (3.1) can be rewritten as R(f, v; bP, bM, dp, dM) = 0 with 
R( wF v)t
t
× = - + å -
=
) ( /P
0
2
q f . (Use (2.3), q qK w d v Li i= + / , the formulas for bR and dR; 
moreover note that wa can be written as wa(bP + bM + (1 - bP - bM)) and P
i
i j
iL p wa= -b ( ) ). 
R(×) = 0 implicitely defines the relation v R= j f( ) . The Pt are linear in v but do not depend on 
f, hence jR is a linear relation. Its slope is determined by implicit differentiation: 
¶j ¶f f
R
vR R/ /= - , with the partial derivatives R vt
t
f q f= - -å <
=
( ) /P
0
2 2 0  and 
 Rv t
t
v= -å <
=
( / ) /¶P ¶ q f
0
2
0 for q > 0, Rv = 0 for q = 0; where the inequality follows from 
explicitely taking derivations of the Pt with respect to v, and using dp < dM, k > 1 and (1 - bP)dM 
< 1 - bPdP < 1 (see the footnote in Section 3.1). 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
We compute, for any q ³ 0, the root f0
R  of jR (where jR(f0
R ) = v = 0) as f0
0
2
0R t
t
wF= å
=
( ( )) /P , 
where Pt(0) denotes profits at v = 0. f0
R  coincides with the root f q0
0N, =  of jN, if q = 0. We know 
already that ¶j ¶fN /  is positive for small q. Then Proposition 1 follows from continuity of jN 
with respect to q and the fact that for small q the root f q0
N,  decreases with q: ¶f q0
N, /¶q = - 
Nq/Nf < 0 (we know Nf < 0; N tt
t t
t
q f f q= - + + <å
+
=
P ( ) / ( )1 02
0
2
, as ¶Pt/¶q = 0 for v = 0). In 
case of pooling the respective assertions hold for any q ³ 0. 
Proof of Propositions 2 - 4 
The influence of the inequality parameters dP, dM, bP, bM on the equilibrium value f* is 
determined by considering the shifts of the jR- and jN-curves caused by an increase of each of 
these parameters in turn. If both curves are shifted into the same direction, then there is an 
unambiguous effect on f* (see Figure 2 in Section 3.2). The shifts are determined by implicit 
differentiation of f with respect to some parameter a, using R(×) = 0 and N(×) = 0. That is, we 
compute¶f ¶a a f
R R R/ /= - , ¶f ¶a a f
N N N/ / ,= -  for a = dP, dM, bP, bM. 
Rf < 0, Nf < 0 is known from before. The signs of R t
t
a ¶P ¶a f= å
=
( / ) /
0
2
 and 
N t
t
t
a ¶P ¶a f= å
é
ëê =
( / ) /
0
2
 ]( ) / ( )f q f q+ +t  are directly determined by differentiation of the 
profits with respect to a, for the four equilibrium situations (note k > 1, dM > dP, 
1 2 2> + > +f f q f q f/ ( ) / ( ) ). Straightforward computation of the bounds on q in the 
Propositions 2 (pooling) and 3B (partially separating, B) completes the proof. 
18 — Zweimüller, Brunner / Heterogeneous Consumers, Vertical Product Differentiation — I H S 
References 
Aghion, Phillipe and Patrick Bolton, "A trickle-down theory of growth and development with 
debt-overhang," mimeo, DELTA, Paris 1991. 
Aghion, Phillipe and Peter Howitt, "A model of growth through creative destruction," 
Econometrica, 60 (1992), 323-351. 
Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik, "Distributive politics and economic growth", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 109 (1994), 465-490. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Andrew F. Newman, "Occupational choice and the process of 
development," Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 274-298. 
Clarke, Roger, "More evidence on income distribution and growth", Journal of Development 
Economics, 47 (1995), 403-427. 
Falkinger, Josef, "An Engelian model of growth and innovation with hierarchic demand and 
unequal incomes," Ricerche Economiche, 48 (1994), 123-139. 
Gabszewicz, J. Jaskold and J.-F. Thisse, "Price competition, quality and income disparities", 
Journal of Economic Theory, 20 (1979), 340 - 359. 
Gabszewicz, J. Jaskold and J.-F. Thisse, "Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry", Journal 
of Economic Theory, 22 (1980), 327 - 338. 
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira, "Income distribution and macroeconomics," Review of 
Economic Studies, 60 (1993), 35-52. 
Glass, Amy J., "Income distribution and quality improvement", mimeo, Ohio State University, 
1995. 
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and growth in the global economy, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT-press, 1991). 
Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "Income distribution, market size, and 
industrialization", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (1989), 537-564. 
O'Donoghue, Ted, Scotchmer, Suzanne and Jaques-Francois Thisse, "Patent breadth, patent 
life and the pace of technological improvement", Working Paper No. 95 - 242, Department 
of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
I H S — Zweimüller, Brunner / Heterogeneous Consumers, Vertical Product Differentiation — 19 
Perotti, Roberto, "Political equilibrium, income distribution, and growth," Review of Economic 
Studies, 60 (1993), 755-776. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, "Is inequality harmful for growth?," American Economic 
Review, 84 (1994), 600-621. 
Saint-Paul, Gilles and Thierry Verdier, "Education, democracy and growth," Journal of 
Development Economics, 42 (1993), 399-407. 
Shaked, A. and John Sutton, "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation," 
Review of Economic Studies, 49 (1982), 3 - 13. 
Shaked, A. and John Sutton, "Natural oligopolies", Econometrica, 51 (1983), 1469 - 1483. 
Torvik, Ragnar, "Talent, growth and income distribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 
95 (1993), 581-596. 
Zweimüller, Josef, "Wealth distribution, innovations, and economic growth," Working paper No. 
9410, University of Linz, 1994. 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
Stumpergasse 56 
A-1060 Vienna 
Austria 
 
Phone: +43-1-599 91-145 
Fax:  +43-1-599 91-163 
